Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes

Christopher Flinn

Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1997, vol. 15, issue 2, 221-36

Abstract: The author develops and estimates an equilibrium model of the labor market in which inefficient employees are systematically eliminated from the sector of the market characterized by asymmetric information and moral hazard. Systematic selection on the distribution of productivity characteristics produces wage sequences which are increasing in tenure for employees never previously terminated even in the absence of long-term contracting between employees and individual firms. The author provides sufficient conditions for there to exist an unique termination-contract type equilibrium and he estimates the equilibrium model using micro-level data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth panel.

Date: 1997
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Related works:
Working Paper: Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes (1993)
Working Paper: Equilibrium Wage and Dismissal Processes (1991)
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