National and supranational banking regulators: between delayed intervention and time inconsistency
Financial Stability Review, 2017, issue 21, 87-94
The implementation of the Banking Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD) resolution rules has brought to light potential differences in standards and conflicts of interest between national and supranational regulators. National regulators may be more inclined to delay regulatory intervention. However, the draconian resolution measures that supranational regulators are to enforce may prove to be time-inconsistent. The banking crises in Italy in 2015 and 2016 – during which the rules envisioned by the BRRD were battle-tested for the first time on a large scale – offer good illustrations of the above issues.
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