The credibility of monetary policy from a New Keynesian perspective

Olivier Loisel

Quarterly selection of articles - Bulletin de la Banque de France, 2007, issue 07, 5-21

Abstract: The New Keynesian reference framework highlights the role played by expectations in the transmission of monetary policy. The article presents the main credibility problems that are likely to arise, illustrated by the experience of various central banks.

Keywords: monetary policy credibility; private agents’ expectations; New Keynesian model; inflation bias; stabilisation bias; self-fulfilling expectations. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bfr:quarte:2007:07:01

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