 INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR REFINANCING MORTGAGE ASSETS IN UKRAINEIryna Krasnova and
Yevhen Metsger
Economic Synergy, 2026, issue 2, 85-104 Abstract: The purpose of the article is to substantiate approaches to adapting institutional mechanisms for refinancing mortgage assets to the conditions of Ukraine, taking into account international experience. Research methods: The study employs methods of analysis and synthesis, comparative analysis, institutional analysis, and logical-structural schematic generalisation. Results: A critical review of the European experience of STS securitisation, the ECB’s APP programmes, and the activities of the Kazakhstan Housing Company (KHC) was carried out. Three main mechanisms were identified: securitisation, asset purchase programmes, and the activities of specialised state operators. It was determined that none of these mechanisms alone is sufficient for Ukraine. A three-level model for adapting mortgage asset refinancing mechanisms to Ukrainian conditions is substantiated. This model is structured according to time horizon and implementation objectives. In the short term, it Ð¿Ñ€ÐµÐ´ÑƒÑ Ð¼Ð°Ñ‚Ñ€Ð¸Ð²Ð°ÐµÑ‚ the establishment of a specialised operator (Ukrfinzhytlo) with an expanded mandate. In the medium term, it envisages the development of liquidity support programmes with the participation of the National Bank of Ukraine, with a threshold share of 10–15%. In the long term, it provides for the launch of a Ukrainian secondary market for mortgage-backed securities based on STS standards. Based on the analysis of Kazakhstan’s experience, the risks of the specialised operator model were identified, including politicisation, lack of transparency, and quasi-fiscal burden, and the conditions for its adaptation to Ukraine were formulated. A quantitative threshold for central bank participation in asset purchase programmes in Ukraine, at 10–15% of the issue volume, is proposed as a development of existing approaches, where the corresponding range for developed markets is estimated at 20–30%. Critical constraints of the institutional-operator model have been identified. Practical significance: The results can inform the development of a mortgage‑backed securities market strategy and the enhancement of refinancing mechanisms. Keywords: mortgage assets; financial instruments; refinancing; securitization; asset purchase programs (APP); government lending programs; regulation; the mortgage securities market; risk; liquidity (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bja:isteus:y:2026:i:2:p:85-104 DOI: 10.53920/ES-2026-2-6 Access Statistics for this article More articles in Economic Synergy from Higher Educational Institution Academician Yuriy Bugay International Scientific & Technical University |
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