Qualia and What it is Like Arguments

Kent B. Olson
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Kent B. Olson: Mlitt, Ph.D., University of Aberdeen, Scotland

International Journal of Research and Scientific Innovation, 2022, vol. 9, issue 8, 13-15

Abstract: Philosophy has always preoccupied itself with questions about the mind and consciousness. However, there are ways in which one could become confused. If there are purely mental facts, then they are so because they are not physical, and they are not completely explainable in a physicalist lexicon. The materialist on some accounts wanted to tell the dualist that mentalese is not translatable (and maybe should be wiped out, as eliminative materialism would have it). Or, on others, that there isn’t any ‘mental’ activity left after reducing it? I hold that qualia and ‘What it is Like’ phenomena both show that there are concepts that can’t be explained in a purely physicalist vocabulary.

Date: 2022
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