Does Firm‐level Political Uncertainty Affect the Mispricing of Earnings? A Natural Experiment through Government‐to‐business Revolving Door
Haijie Huang,
Edward Lee,
Changjiang Lyu and
Zhenmei (Judy) Zhu
Abacus, 2024, vol. 60, issue 3, 446-491
Abstract:
We utilize a unique setting associated with the mandatory closure of the government‐to‐business revolving door to examine whether and how an exogenous rise in firm‐level political uncertainty affects the mispricing of earnings. The tension that underlies our study stems from two opposing effects. To the extent that such uncertainty can trigger opinion divergence (rational attention) among investors, it is expected to delay (accelerate) price discovery and increase (decrease) security mispricing. Our identification strategy draws on the difference‐in‐differences analysis associated with the Chinese regulation in 2013 that mandated the resignation of corporate independent directors with a government background. Consistent with the dominance of the opinion divergence effect, we observe that these involuntary resignations unintentionally increase delays in share price responses following earnings announcements. These findings are more evident among firms that enjoy more benefits from independent directors with a government background. Further analyses confirm that these involuntary resignations trigger more opinion divergence rather than rational attention among investors by showing significant increases in analyst forecast diversity but no changes in analyst coverage following such resignations. We provide novel evidence that market information efficiency could deteriorate as an unintended consequence of the escalation of firm‐level political uncertainty.
Date: 2024
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