 Role of corporate governance in mitigating the selective disclosure of executive stock option informationJodie Nelson, Gerry Gallery and Majella Percy Accounting and Finance, 2010, vol. 50, issue 3, 685-717 Abstract: We examine the nature and extent of statutory executive stock option disclosures by Australian listed companies over the 2001–2004 period, and the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on these disclosures. Our results show a progressive increase in overall compliance from 2001 to 2004. However, despite the improved compliance, the results reveal managements’ continued reluctance to disclose more sensitive executive stock option information. Factors associated with good internal governance, including board independence, audit committee independence and effectiveness, and compensation committee independence and effectiveness are found to contribute to improved compliance. Similarly, certain external governance factors are associated with improved disclosure, including external auditor quality, shareholder activism (as proxied by companies identified as poor performers by the Australian Shareholders’ Association) and regulatory intervention. Date: 2010 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:50:y:2010:i:3:p:685-717 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Accounting and Finance is currently edited by Robert Faff More articles in Accounting and Finance from Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Contact information at EDIRC. |
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