Dependent on one but vulnerable to another: opportunism threats and control solutions for customization providers

Sridharan Vg and Michelle M. S. Phang

Accounting and Finance, 2014, vol. 54, issue 2, 591-624

Abstract: type="main" xml:lang="en">

While economic theory suggests that identifying alternate customers is costlier than identifying alternate specialized employees for customization providers, substantial field research evidence indicates the opposite, where providers are reportedly more dependent on employees than customers. We inquire into this contrasting picture between theory and practice through an in-depth case study that suggests that what begins as customer dependence transforms into vulnerability to employees. While perceived vulnerability to customers is efficiently removed through ex ante controls, the physical asset specificity in each customer order generates task uncertainty, specialization and teamwork, which become the new sources of opportunism threat for the customization providers. Compounded layers of ex ante and ex post controls with frequent iterations suggest a need for continuous management (as against removal) of vulnerability to employees.

Date: 2014
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