Timing of earnings restatements: CEO equity compensation and market reaction

Nourhene BenYoussef and Saqib Khan

Accounting and Finance, 2018, vol. 58, issue 2, 341-365

Abstract: This study investigates the impact of chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation on their choices regarding the timing of earnings restatements. The results indicate a negative relationship between options exercised and lags in disclosing the restated earnings, suggesting that managers who exercise options in a given year tend to release information quickly. This effect is more pronounced if the options are exercised after the dark period. We also find that the market penalises longer lags in the restatement disclosure. It seems that the CEO would try to optimise the timing of information release so as to balance the costs and benefits.

Date: 2018
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