Remuneration committees, shareholder dissent on CEO pay and the CEO pay–performance link

Pamela Kent, Kim Kercher and James Routledge

Accounting and Finance, 2018, vol. 58, issue 2, 445-475

Abstract: We provide evidence on whether the adoption of the full Australian Securities Exchange recommendations for remuneration committee formation and structure are associated with a lower shareholder dissenting vote or a stronger CEO pay–performance link. We find some evidence that a minority†and majority†independent remuneration committee and a committee size of at least the recommended three members are associated with lower shareholder dissent. Companies with an independent committee have a stronger CEO pay–performance link. In addition, a majority†independent committee strengthens the link between performance and growth in CEO pay.

Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:58:y:2018:i:2:p:445-475

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