Can banks monitor small business borrowers effectively using hard information?
Daisuke Tsuruta ()
Accounting and Finance, 2020, vol. 60, issue 4, 4291-4330
We investigate whether banks rely on hard information to monitor small business borrowers and to what extent hard information is credible. Using Japanese firm‐level data, we show that banks reduce the amount of lending to defaulting firms if the firms are financially distressed and suffer operating losses. In contrast, banks do not significantly reduce the amount of lending to defaulting firms with low levels of leverage and high profitability. This implies that banks mitigate type II errors if they receive default signals using the hard information of informationally opaque small businesses.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:acctfi:v:60:y:2020:i:4:p:4291-4330
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0810-5391
Access Statistics for this article
Accounting and Finance is currently edited by Robert Faff
More articles in Accounting and Finance from Accounting and Finance Association of Australia and New Zealand Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().