Size‐conditioned mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation
Robert Faff and
Accounting and Finance, 2020, vol. 60, issue 4, 4387-4417
We add to the literature on the real effects of macroprudential regulation by investigating the novel link between a mandatory capital adequacy disclosure and bank intermediation. The mandatory disclosure stems from the Federal Reserve regulation change of 2013 and leads to identification of bank intermediation effects with treatment methods. A combined empirical strategy of difference‐in‐differences and regression discontinuity design point to economically significant evidence for the reduction of both lending and on‐balance sheet liquidity creation, for banks that disclose their capital adequacy as prescribed by the regulation.
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