Dealing with High Bank Interest Margins in Tunisia: A Dynamic Panel Investigation
Zied Saadaoui
African Development Review, 2018, vol. 30, issue 4, 434-448
Abstract:
By investigating factors influencing interest margins adjustment, this paper aims to provide some answers on how to improve the efficiency of the Tunisian banking system. Focusing on different theoretical views on the determinants of banks intermediation margins using a quite representative sample observed between 1999 and 2014, we estimate an augmented model using the system GMM estimator assuming the existence of adjustment costs. Estimations results and robustness checks show that reducing intermediation margins of Tunisian banks is fundamentally a matter of improving cost efficiency, scale economies and competitiveness. Considering the highly distressed economic and financial context in which Tunisian banks operate since 2011, we think that improving bank efficiency and credit access in Tunisia is closely related to the capacity of the government and the regulatory authority to enforce urgent strategic reforms in order to consolidate the banking system and to improve its competitiveness.
Date: 2018
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8268.12350
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:afrdev:v:30:y:2018:i:4:p:434-448
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1017-6772
Access Statistics for this article
African Development Review is currently edited by John C. Anyanwu, Hassan Aly and Kupukile Mlambo
More articles in African Development Review from African Development Bank Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().