Asymmetric information in cattle auctions: the problem of revaccinations

Athanasios Chymis, Harvey James, Srinivasa Konduru, Vern L. Pierce and Robert L. Larson

Agricultural Economics, 2007, vol. 36, issue 1, 79-88

Abstract: We analyze the problem of asymmetric information between buyers and sellers in cattle auctions, using the problem of revaccinations as the point of departure. We present a simple model to show that if buyers do not know and cannot verify whether sellers have vaccinated their animals, then they may consider revaccination. Revaccination is only a part of the broader problem of information asymmetry that includes other quality issues and costs that can be saved, thereby affecting the welfare of both buyers and sellers. We consider structural characteristics of ranching, traditions, and consumers' preferences as well as proposals regarding third‐party certification to argue that the problem of asymmetric information in cattle auctions is a persistent one. We also argue for a comprehensive empirical study of the incidence and impacts of buyer revaccination.

Date: 2007
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2007.00178.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:agecon:v:36:y:2007:i:1:p:79-88

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0169-5150

Access Statistics for this article

Agricultural Economics is currently edited by W.A. Masters and G.E. Shively

More articles in Agricultural Economics from International Association of Agricultural Economists Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().