The Protection of the Public Interest in the Context of Competitive Tendering

G. Püttner

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2003, vol. 74, issue 1, 107-116

Abstract: Public contracts increasingly have to be awarded through a procedure of public competitive tendering. State and other public bodies awarding public service contracts use this mechanism to require bidders to meet specific public interests, for example, certain environment standards, the promotion of women, or the employment of long‐term unemployed persons. Such requirements impose upon bidders criteria not explicitly related to the contract, the implementation of which increases the project's cost and thus precludes the selection of the most economic offer, contrary to what is required by European recommendations. However the European Court of Justice has accepted such practice by Member States, considering it their right to organize themselves, within certain conditions, which are reviewed in this paper.

Date: 2003
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