INCENTIVE REGULATION AND THE ROLE OF CONVEXITY IN BENCHMARKING ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION: ECONOMISTS VERSUS ENGINEERS

Emili Grifell‐tatjé and Kristiaan Kerstens
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Emili Grifell-Tatje

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2008, vol. 79, issue 2, 227-248

Abstract: ABSTRACT**: This note illustrates the potential impact of the specification of a convex production technology on establishing minimal costs compared to the use of a non‐convex technology when benchmarking electricity distributors. This methodological reflection is mainly motivated by recent engineering literature providing evidence for non‐convexities in electricity distribution. An empirical illustration using non‐parametric specifications of technology illustrates this main point using a sample of Spanish electricity distribution firms earlier analysed in Grifell‐Tatjé and Lovell (2003).

Date: 2008
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8292.2008.00364.x

Related works:
Working Paper: Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists versus Engineers (2008)
Working Paper: Incentive Regulation and the Role of Convexity in Benchmarking Electricity Distribution: Economists versus Engineers (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:79:y:2008:i:2:p:227-248

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1370-4788

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics is currently edited by Marco Marini

More articles in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().