Incentives, Procurement and Regulation of Work Integration Social Enterprises in France: Old Ideas for New Firms?

Patrick Gianfaldoni and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2015, vol. 86, issue 2, 199-219

Abstract: Work Integration Social Enterprises (WISEs) in France become increasingly dependent on commercial resources through public and private markets. Following New Public Management reforms that try to modernize the sector via market oriented management, they have restructured and modified their practices. We compare the normative prescriptions of the theory of incentives in regulation to the actual practices. The trend toward competitive process is described and the form of incentives contract toward workfare is detailed. Are the main insights of this literature appealing for this kind of enterprises? Do the traditional incentives and contract theories ignore some very specific features of WISEs entities? We point out the drawbacks of potentially inaccurate forms of regulation contracts currently used.

Date: 2015
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