FIRMS, NONPROFITS, AND COOPERATIVES: A THEORY OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHOICE

Patrick Herbst and Jens Prüfer

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2016, vol. 87, issue 3, 315-343

Abstract: We formalize the difference between profit-maximizing firms, nonprofits, and cooperatives and identify optimal organizational choice in a model of quality provision. Firms provide lowest and nonprofits highest levels of quality. Efficiency, however, depends on the competitive environment, the decision making process among owners and technology. Firms are optimal when decision making costs are high. Else, firms are increasingly dominated by either nonprofits or cooperatives. Increased competition improves relative efficiency of firms and decreases relative efficiency of nonprofits.

Date: 2016
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