MERITOCRACY, EFFICIENCY, INCENTIVES AND VOTING IN COOPERATIVE PRODUCTION: A SURVEY

Carmen Bevia () and Luis Corchon

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2018, vol. 89, issue 1, 87-107

Abstract: This paper surveys selectively several contributions to the understanding of how cooperatives may cope with the interplay between meritocracy and efficiency when public decisions are taking by voting and the supply of labor is freely decided by each member. This outlines the main trade-off faced by cooperatives. In particular, the degree of meritocracy is limited by three factors: (1) efficiency, because too much meritocracy encourages too much work from the socially optimal point of view; (2) meritocracy encourages sabotage; and (3) voting, because workers may prefer inefficient reward schemes as long as they are individually profitable.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/apce.2018.89.issue-1/issuetoc
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:88:y:2017:i:3:p:87-107

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1370-4788

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics is currently edited by Marco Marini

More articles in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().