SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Saibal Kar (), Biswajit Mandal, Sugata Marjit and Vivekananda Mukherjee

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2020, vol. 91, issue 1, 151-164

Abstract: Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.

Date: 2020
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https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12253

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Working Paper: Seeking Rent in the Informal Sector (2019)
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