Board‐level employee representative independence: Myth or reality? Theoretical analysis and empirical research—the case for Slovenia
Valentina Franca and
Anja Strojin Štampar
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2021, vol. 92, issue 4, 569-585
This article examines board‐level employee representative independence with regard to said representatives’ dual role as employee representatives and supervisory body members. In the context of corporate governance, board member independence has been of increasing interest, though this has mostly been related to shareholder representatives. We address board‐level employee representative independence focused on Slovenia, a central‐eastern European country with a developed system of employee participation. We conducted qualitative research at twelve public limited companies in Slovenia to gain in‐depth understanding, with a CEO or board member, board‐level employee representative and works councillor not at board‐level being interviewed in situ following the same semi‐structured format. Results indicate legal and practical concern regarding board‐level employee representative independence, calling for further research and regulation.
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:92:y:2021:i:4:p:569-585
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