Endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly under the optimal degree of privatization

Kojun Hamada

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2021, vol. 92, issue 4, 689-704

Abstract: This study revisits the endogenous timing game in a mixed duopoly by considering the situation in which a welfare‐maximizing government sets the optimal degree of privatization for a partially privatized firm. We present the following results. First, in quantity competition, the government sets the degree of privatization for the partially privatized firm to be positive or zero depending on the equilibrium in the subsequent observable delay game. The observable delay game has multiple equilibria and the firms choose either of two Stackelberg equilibria. Second, in price competition, the government chooses to fully nationalize the partially privatized firm, leading to a unique Bertrand equilibrium in the observable delay game.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12292

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:92:y:2021:i:4:p:689-704

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1370-4788

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics is currently edited by Marco Marini

More articles in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().