Punishment mechanisms and cooperation in public goods games: Experimental evidence

Hui‐Chun Peng

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2022, vol. 93, issue 3, 533-549

Abstract: This paper proposes the majority‐voting punishment mechanism and compares its effect on the contribution decision with other punishment mechanisms when individuals have homogeneous or heterogeneous marginal per capita returns on public goods. The experimental results show that if individuals are homogeneous, the majority‐voting punishment mechanism is an alternative to encourage cooperation and reduce antisocial punishment. But, if individuals are heterogeneous, the individual and majority‐voting punishment mechanisms are similarly effective in promoting cooperation in the organization. Furthermore, whatever punishment mechanism is implemented, organizations should pay attention to the problem of antisocial punishment.

Date: 2022
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