Managing goal conflict. The case of agency theory in the policy settings for public–private partnerships; A perspective on citizen and government interests

Sebastian Zwalf

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2022, vol. 93, issue 4, 913-930

Abstract: Over the last three decades, public–private partnerships (PPPs) have become an increasingly large part of the infrastructure program of governments around the world. They have been met with a high degree of academic interest, much of which has been critical. A significant strand of this criticism has focused on the drivers of governments that have chosen to employ PPPs. This article brings together an analysis of these scholarly criticisms and considers these assumed drivers against an agency theory framework. Until now, no scholarly article has considered the role of agency theory in the assumed drivers for governments to use PPPs. This paper finds that agency theory has strong explanatory power for the emergence of PPPs as the infrastructure delivery model preferred by governments and, in particular, has helped governments to manage the conflicting interests of citizen groups.

Date: 2022
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