Emission taxes for genuine altruistic firms
Giorgos Diakoulakis and
Athanasios Kampas
Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2023, vol. 94, issue 1, 343-359
Abstract:
This article develops a theoretical model that explores firms' abatement choices. The main results are: First, in a market comprised of a not sufficiently large number of heterogeneous firms always there exists a subset of firms that are willing to undertake abatement activities, if their marginal altruistic cost of emissions is positive. Second, a low emission tax induces abatement when a firm is egoistic or if its altruistic cost of emissions has a concave structure. In contrast, if the firms’ altruistic cost of emissions has a convex structure, then intermediate emission taxes are required. Third, the effect of firms’ altruistic cost of emissions on the emission tax that induce the socially optimum abatement is also conditional on the genuine altruistic preferences and finally, the social planner has an incentive to impose a Pigouvian emission tax when firms are profit maximizers. Otherwise, a lower tax suffices.
Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12369
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:94:y:2023:i:1:p:343-359
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