How do business associations support contract enforcement? Evidence from Hungary

Károly Mike, István Boza and Gábor Tamás Molnár

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, 2024, vol. 95, issue 4, 1021-1060

Abstract: Business associations (BAs) are often mentioned among formal private‐order institutions that support contract enforcement. Despite their ubiquity, evidence about their actual roles is still very limited. We explore empirically four mechanisms through which they can support the credibility of contractual commitments: member selection, norm enforcement, dispute resolution and information sharing. In a developed legal context, firm‐level data from an economy‐wide managerial survey show that BAs support contractual trust among members, in members by outsiders as well as in outsiders by members. Member selection and information sharing stand out as the most important mechanisms: They help all three relationship types. Dispute resolution helps overcome opportunism between members only. Formalized norm enforcement is a signal of trustworthiness for outsiders. Economic theory suggests that BAs can help establish trust beyond personal and local networks. We find strong evidence that they indeed do.

Date: 2024
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/apce.12479

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:annpce:v:95:y:2024:i:4:p:1021-1060

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=1370-4788

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics is currently edited by Marco Marini

More articles in Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().