The clientelism trap in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea, and its impact on aid policy
Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, 2018, vol. 5, issue 3, 481-494
Clientelism is a central feature of politics in Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea. Most voters vote in search of personalized or localized benefit, and most politicians focus on delivering benefits to their supporters at the expense of national governance. In this article, I explain how clientelism impedes development in both countries. I then describe underdevelopment's role in causing clientelism. I also explain the resulting trap: clientelism causes underdevelopment, and underdevelopment causes clientelism. Because of the trap, clientelism will shape the two countries' politics for the foreseeable future. However, the history of other countries gives cause to believe it can be overcome in the long‐run. In the second half of the paper, I explain how change may occur. I also outline implications for aid policy, looking at how clientelism constrains the impact aid can have, and explaining how donors can act to maximize their impact in a difficult environment.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:asiaps:v:5:y:2018:i:3:p:481-494
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=2050-2680
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().