Endogenous Cartel Formation

B. Eaton () and Mukesh Eswaran

Australian Economic Papers, 1998, vol. 37, issue 1, 1-13

Abstract: This paper investigates the endogenous formation of cartels in a supergame framework in which cheating on the cartel agreement results in the ejection of only the defector from the cartel while collusion continue s amongst the non‐cheating members. A more sophisticated notion of cartel stability than has been analysed hitherto is developed here, and it is shown that cartels are even less stable than they are generally believed to be. When firms produce heterogeneous goods and set prices, cartels comprising a small fraction of the industry's firms are shown to be viable. The emergence of two or more cartels within the same industry is seen not only to be a distinct possibility but also to be quite likely

Date: 1998
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