The Non‐Robustness of the Nash‐Stackelberg‐Hybrid Equilibrium

David Prentice and Hugh Sibly

Australian Economic Papers, 1998, vol. 37, issue 4, 383-393

Abstract: In a simple, standard sequential search model, the Nash‐Stackelberg‐Hybrid equilibrium is shown, in general, to be non‐robust when the assumption that all firms are constrained to operate one outlet is dropped. Unless the firms are constrained from increasing the number of outlets or the price, they will open additional outlets to increase their market power. In a standard duopoly model an equilibrium featuring both firms operating multiple outlets is shown to exist.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8454.00028

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecp:v:37:y:1998:i:4:p:383-393

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0004-900X

Access Statistics for this article

Australian Economic Papers is currently edited by Daniel Leonard

More articles in Australian Economic Papers from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().