R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution

Emmanuel Petrakis and Joanna Poyago‐Theotoky
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Joanna Poyago-Theotoky

Australian Economic Papers, 2002, vol. 41, issue 1, 37-52

Abstract: We introduce pollution, as a by‐product of production, into a non‐tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre‐competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation.

Date: 2002
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