R&D Subsidies versus R&D Cooperation in a Duopoly with Spillovers and Pollution
Emmanuel Petrakis () and
Australian Economic Papers, 2002, vol. 41, issue 1, 37-52
We introduce pollution, as a by-product of production, into a non-tournament model of R&D with spillovers. Technology policy takes the form of either R&D subsidisation or pre-competitive R&D cooperation. We show that, when the emissions tax is exogenous, the optimal R&D subsidy can be negative, i.e. there should be a tax on R&D, depending on the extent of the appropriability problem and the degree of environmental damage. In a wide class of cases, depending on the parameter values, welfare in the case of R&D cooperation, is lower than welfare in the case of R&D subsidisation. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishers Ltd/University of Adelaide and Flinders University of South Australia
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