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Comparing Horizontal Mergers Under Cournot with Bertrand Competitions

Pu-yan Nie

Australian Economic Papers, 2018, vol. 57, issue 1, 55-80

Abstract: Taking the product substitutability into account, this paper considers the horizontal mergers under Cournot with Bertrand competition. Firstly, the big market size indicates non†intention to merge. Secondly, independent goods indicate indifferences between the quantity competition and price competition. Finally, firms under quantity competition are more willing to merge than under price competition. The antitrust authority is more inclined to approve the merger under quantity competition than that under price competition.

Date: 2018
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