The Economics of Law: Economic Imperialism in Negligence Law, No‐Fault Insurance, Occupational Licensing and Criminology?

Peter Swan

Australian Economic Review, 1984, vol. 17, issue 3, 92-108

Abstract: The aim is to examine the contribution which economic and quantitative analysis can make to a better understanding of the law. I concentrate on the common law action of negligence and how it is related to the optimal deterrence of accidents, rather than to the compensation of all accident victims. A critique is made of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission's proposal to prohibit negligence actions for motor vehicle accidents and to introduce a compulsory ‘no‐fault’ scheme. An econometric analysis of new Zealand and Australian ‘no‐fault’ schemes finds that the negligence system appears to have some deterrent effect on motor vehicle accidents.

Date: 1984
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.1984.tb00460.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:17:y:1984:i:3:p:92-108

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... 7-8462&ref=1467-8462

Access Statistics for this article

Australian Economic Review is currently edited by John de New, Viet Hoang Nguyen and Susan Méndez

More articles in Australian Economic Review from The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().