 Bank Deregulation, Supervision, and Agency ProblemsKevin Davis Australian Economic Review, 1995, vol. 28, issue 3, 43-54 Abstract: This article argues that the financial instability of the 1980s following financial deregulation in Australia can be partly traced to a lack of attention to agency problems in banking. Because the market for corporate control and corporate governance structures in banking were unsatisfactory, the benefits of increased competition in financial product markets were offset by inadequate monitoring and controls on bank management. It is also argued that the current emphasis of prudential supervision on capital adequacy requirements can provide only a partial solution to achieving efficiency and stability in the financial sector—because it focuses only upon the agency relationships between owners and government/depositors. Complementary developments in corporate governance and control are required to address agency relationships involving bank management. Some recent developments in this area and in supervision of non‐bank financial markets are assessed from the perspective developed in this article. Date: 1995 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:28:y:1995:i:3:p:43-54 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Australian Economic Review is currently edited by John de New, Viet Hoang Nguyen and Susan Méndez More articles in Australian Economic Review from The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research Contact information at EDIRC. |
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