Absence Penalties and Work Attendance

Jeffrey Balchin and Mark Wooden

Australian Economic Review, 1995, vol. 28, issue 4, 43-58

Abstract: This article extends previous economic treatments of the work attendance decision by providing a more complete specification of the absence penalty function. In particular, the penalty for absence is modelled as a function of both the opportunity cost of dismissal for excessive absence and the level of threat of dismissal chosen by management to control absence. Moreover, since the probability of dismissal is itself a function of the absence rate, a simultaneous system is posited. Strong support for the model is found in workplace‐level data collected as part of the 1989–90 Australian Workplace Industrial Relations Survey.

Date: 1995
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.1995.tb00903.x

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:ausecr:v:28:y:1995:i:4:p:43-58

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://ordering.onl ... 7-8462&ref=1467-8462

Access Statistics for this article

Australian Economic Review is currently edited by John de New, Viet Hoang Nguyen and Susan Méndez

More articles in Australian Economic Review from The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().