Of Grand Prix and Circuses

Joshua Gans

Australian Economic Review, 1996, vol. 29, issue 3, 299-307

Abstract: The public competition between states for major events such as the Indy Car, Formula One and Motor Cycle Grand Prix is analysed from a simple game theoretic perspective. It is demonstrated that such competition is, in general, harmful to the states themselves. Competition leads to greater payments for events to promoters, distortions in the type of event eventually held and, sometimes, the wrong state holding the event. These considerations give a prima facie case for central coordination of event attraction to Australia.

Date: 1996
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8462.1996.tb00936.x

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