Entry Deterrence and the Efficient Component Pricing Rule

Philip L. Williams

Australian Economic Review, 1997, vol. 30, issue 2, 185-186

Abstract: This note comments on the article ‘Entry and Entry Deterrence under the New Access Code’ by Amiti and Maddock, published in the Australian Economic Review, 3rd quarter 1996. It is found that Amiti and Maddock do not show that efficient component pricing by an incumbent vertically‐integrated monopolist will deter socially efficient entry of a new competitor.

Date: 1997
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