Macroeconomic Constraints, Social Learning and Pay Bargaining in Europe

Paul Teague

British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2000, vol. 38, issue 3, 429-452

Abstract: This paper argues that European integration has constrained the discretion of industrial relations actors. The result has been not the widely predicted institutional fragmentation of collective bargaining, but a change in the functioning of these systems. At the same time, widespread ‘social dumping’ on the part of firms and member states has not materialized. The paper argues that the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis gives insufficient weight to the socialization mechanisms attached to the European integration process. Thus macroeconomic constraints and social learning processes are co‐mingling with one another in European industrial relations.

Date: 2000
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:38:y:2000:i:3:p:429-452

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