Union Co‐operation in a Context of Job Insecurity: Negotiated Outcomes from Teamworking

Nicolas Bacon and Paul Blyton

British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2006, vol. 44, issue 2, 215-237

Abstract: This paper explores the ‘mutual gains’ argument that employees benefit when teamworking is introduced alongside employee involvement in problem‐solving and within a co‐operative industrial relations climate. It reports worker outcomes from negotiations to introduce teamworking across two steelworks. Moderate union branches and employees at one of the works (Scunthorpe) co‐operated with managers in joint problem‐solving teams to redesign work. However, contrary to mutual gains expectations, greater job insecurity at this works coerced union branches to accept teamworking agreements containing extensive demanning and a pay increase for fewer employees. Employees perceived greater job security at the other works (Teesside) and by rejecting joint problem‐solving with managers, militant union branches protected more jobs and extracted higher payment for teamworking. The findings indicate that job insecurity can lead co‐operative unions down a slippery slope of coerced co‐operation restricting employee benefits from teamworking.

Date: 2006
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https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8543.2006.00495.x

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:44:y:2006:i:2:p:215-237

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