There is power in a union? Union members' preferences and the conditional effect of labour unions on left parties in different welfare state programmes
Fabian Engler and
Linda Voigt
British Journal of Industrial Relations, 2023, vol. 61, issue 1, 89-109
Abstract:
This article studies the effect of labour unions on policy‐making in six different parts of the welfare state (passive and active labour market policy, employment protection, old‐age pensions, health care and education) in OECD countries after 1980 with a two‐level strategy: At the micro‐level, we investigate union members’ preferences. Ordered logit regression analyses indicate that union members favour generous social policies more strongly than non‐members. Moreover, this effect is stronger for programmes closely related to the labour market than for programmes without a strong labour market link. At the macro‐level, we investigate the conditional effect of unions on left parties expecting the former to push the left towards more generous labour market‐related (but not towards less‐labour market‐related) programmes. Regression analyses essentially provide evidence for such a relationship. Overall, unions have been powerful in promoting their members’ social policy preferences via left parties in government but their power is recently vanishing.
Date: 2023
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https://doi.org/10.1111/bjir.12665
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:brjirl:v:61:y:2023:i:1:p:89-109
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