A Note on Government Intervention in Occupational Safety and Health: The Case for an Accident Tax and a Safety Bonus Scheme

Paul Lanoie

Bulletin of Economic Research, 1994, vol. 46, issue 2, 185-91

Abstract: Using a fairly general principal-agent model in which both firms and workers can affect the risk of a workplace accident, this note shows theoretically that an accident tax and/or a safety bonus scheme could unambiguously reduce the incidence of workplace accidents, contrary to the ambiguous theoretical results that are obtained with safety regulations. Copyright 1994 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 1994
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