Monetary Policy Delegation and Optimal Wage Indexation

Iannis A Mourmouras

Bulletin of Economic Research, 1997, vol. 49, issue 4, 303-07

Abstract: This note shows that delegation of policy to a central banker who puts more weight on inflation stabilization than does the rest of society could reduce the alleged social inefficiency of private wage indexation decisions that arises in models of discretionary monetary policy. Copyright 1997 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 1997
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