An Asymmetric Information Model for Lockouts

Timothy Fisher

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2001, vol. 53, issue 2, 153-59

Abstract: This note proposes an asymmetric information model of collective bargaining where the firm has the bargaining power and the union the private information. Results show that the firm may use lockouts to induce the union to reveal its private information. Copyright 2001 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research

Date: 2001
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