Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies

Abderrahmane Ziad

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2003, vol. 55, issue 3, 311-317

Abstract: We consider an n‐person non‐zero‐sum non‐cooperative game in normal form, where the strategy sets are some closed intervals of the real line. It is shown that if the pay‐off functions are continuous on the whole space and if for each pay‐off function the smallest local maximum in the strategy variable is a global maximum, then the game possesses a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2003
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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8586.00178

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Working Paper: Nash equilibria in pure strategies (2003)
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