EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Collusion in Differentiated Duopolies with Quadratic Costs

David Collie

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2006, vol. 58, issue 2, 151-159

Abstract: The analysis of collusion in infinitely repeated duopoly games has generally assumed that marginal cost is constant, but this note uses quadratic costs (linear marginal costs) to compare the sustainability of collusion under Bertrand and Cournot duopoly with differentiated products. It is shown that when marginal costs are sufficiently increasing in output, then it is always easier to sustain collusion under Cournot duopoly than under Bertrand duopoly for any degree of product substitutability. Copyright Blackwell Publishers Ltd and the Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research, 2006.

Date: 2006
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent ... &year=2006&part=null link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:58:y:2006:i:2:p:151-159

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0307-3378

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Bulletin of Economic Research from Wiley Blackwell
Series data maintained by Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing ().

 
Page updated 2017-10-17
Handle: RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:58:y:2006:i:2:p:151-159