REGULATION OF POLLUTION IN THE LABORATORY: RANDOM INSPECTIONS, AMBIENT INSPECTIONS, AND COMMITMENT PROBLEMS
Julie Le Gallo () and
Laurent Franckx ()
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2015, vol. 67, issue S1, S40-S73
We compare experimentally a traditional random inspection policy and a variant where the agency may carry out a preliminary inspection of the level of ambient pollution before implementing any individual inspection. Since the agency may have an incentive to announce high inspection probabilities and then secretly renege on its announcement to avoid implementing costly inspections, we are also interested in the agency's commitment power. We find that overall, ambient inspections increase efficiency but the effect is weaker than expected when the agency has no commitment power; and polluters' reactions to the lack of commitment power of the agency vary depending on whether the agency uses ambient inspections or not.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:67:y:2015:i:s1:p:s40-s73
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0307-3378
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Bulletin of Economic Research from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().