RISK†SHARING MATCHING AND MORAL HAZARD

Pu Chen, Sanxi Li and Bing Ye

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2018, vol. 70, issue 2, 165-174

Abstract: In this study we model the endogenous relationship formation between risk†averse principals and agents in a CARA†normal framework. Agents exert unobservable efforts to increase mean outputs and reduce risks. We show that risk†reduction efforts are more important than mean†increasing efforts in determining the matching patterns. Compared to cases without moral hazard, the agency problem in risk reduction induces more positive†assortative matchings.

Date: 2018
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