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REMARKS ON A PROCEDURAL CONDITION FOR THE VOTING PARADOX

Sususmu Cato ()

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2019, vol. 71, issue 3, 549-557

Abstract: Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688–695] provides a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotence‐partition condition. This paper aims to clarify his result by providing several remarks. We show that a main result of Schwartz can be strengthened by replacing strong Pareto by weak Pareto. We also discuss how the impotence partition is related to the standard concept of decisiveness, which is widely employed in the literature on social choice.

Date: 2019
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