R&D Information sharing in a mixed duopoly and incentive subsidy for research joint venture competition
Sang-Ho Lee () and
Timur Muminov ()
Bulletin of Economic Research, 2021, vol. 73, issue 2, 154-170
This study investigates the incentives for R&D (research and development) information sharing in a mixed duopoly and finds a contrasting result that public firm chooses full sharing while private firm enjoys free‐riding. We then devise an agreement‐based incentive R&D subsidy scheme for RJV (research joint venture) competition, which can internalize R&D spillovers between firms and induce them to earn higher payoffs through full sharing of their R&D information. We also discuss welfare loss of the proposed R&D subsidy scheme, compare with production subsidy and provide some policy‐relevant implications on privatization.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: R&D Output Sharing in a Mixed Duopoly and Incentive Subsidy Policy (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:73:y:2021:i:2:p:154-170
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0307-3378
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Bulletin of Economic Research from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().