Corporate governance, product innovation, and competition

Rune Stenbacka

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2022, vol. 74, issue 4, 1067-1074

Abstract: We show that duopolistic innovation competition between identical firms may lead to an equilibrium with asymmetric corporate governance modes with one firm being shareholder oriented and its rival stakeholder oriented. This happens if the benefit associated with innovation success faced by the stakeholders falls short of an endogenously determined threshold. Above this threshold, the corporate governance equilibrium is symmetric with both firms oriented toward maximization of shareholder value.

Date: 2022
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12332

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:buecrs:v:74:y:2022:i:4:p:1067-1074

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... bs.asp?ref=0307-3378

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Bulletin of Economic Research from Wiley Blackwell
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().