Does risk aversion explain behavior in a lemon market?

Lihui Lin

Bulletin of Economic Research, 2023, vol. 75, issue 2, 413-425

Abstract: Siegenthaler proposes an ingenious solution to the lemon market adverse selection problem. He incorporates ‘‘cheap talk’’ in which sellers send out costless and nonbinding messages informing potential buyers of the quality of their goods; these messages could be true or false. This segments the market into several submarkets. Potential buyers need to decide which submarket to enter and what price to bid for the goods. Sellers then decide whether to accept the bid or not. He experimentally tests his model and finds that the comparative static results align with his theory, although the data do not exactly fit the model. Indeed, he does not fit the model to the data. His theory assumes risk‐neutral decision‐makers (DMs). Two reasons why the fit is not perfect may be that the DMs are not risk neutral and not perfectly rational. In this note, we report the results of fitting an asymmetric risk averse quantal response equilibrium (QRE) extension of his model to his data, and we find that the extension fits well. We show that the results are consistent with the market evidence and shed light on future research on lemon markets.

Date: 2023
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